Jim Rasenberger’s new book about the Bay of Pigs is an hour-by-hour (1) ……………of the invasion and the events that led up to it.
Mr. JIM RASENBERGER (Author, "The Brilliant Disaster"): It really was the beginning of an era that we still live in today of (2) …………… interventions. You know, before the Bay of Pigs, very few Americans would have doubted that they lived in a country that was run by competent men engaged in (3) ……………enterprises. But the Bay of Pigs changed that.
Many people viewed the event as (4) …………… and incompetent. The aspect of questioning authority that would go on through the Vietnam era really began with the Bay of Pigs.
The interviewer suggests that most people blamed the CIA as the (5) …………… who pushed Kennedy to move forward with the invasion.
Rasenberger states that although he agrees that the CIA pushed the operation, objects to the idea that they somehow (6) …………… or …………… the President.
The author of the book believes that Kennedy went ahead with the invasion because he had no choice but to go (7) ……………with it.
The interviewer asks if the (8) …………… /…………… in the disaster was the fact that the second airstrike did not take place.
Rasenberger confirms that this is the case by describing the events and by stating that it was understood that Castro had to have no airplanes for the invasion to work. He states that Kennedy cancelled the (9) ……………/ ………. airstrikes on the evening of April 17th.
As a result, the American brigade were left (10) …………… on the beach they had just conquered and the soldiers were (11) …………… at this point.
Rasenberger believes that Kennedy found himself in a very difficult position: he had to take action but he was very worried about lighting a match that could (12) …………… a nuclear war with the Soviet Union.
Rasenberger believes that Kennedy ended up in a good position: he took action and showed himself to be strong (13) …………… /…………… but as the invasion failed, he didn’t have to deal with the consequences that might have come about had he succeeded.
When discussing possible comparisons between the bay of Pigs and what is happening now in Libya, Rasenberger says that Iraq has shown that you cannot expect to invade a country and have all the locals (14) …………… behind your cause.
When discussing Libya, Rasenberger says that you never know the results of this kind of action. In the case of Cuba, Castro became even more (15) ……………/ ……………to the Soviet Union after the invasion.
He adds that it might be a good idea for American presidents to include
In their administration some people who are perhaps not supreme successes but also people who are (16) …………… with things not going well.
6. tricked or fooled
8. tipping point
13. on communism
14. come and gather
15. closely tied
Heard on All Things Considered
April 17, 2011 - NOAH ADAMS, host:
At the top of this hour, we heard from Jim Rasenberger, who's written a new book about the Bay of Pigs. It's called "The Brilliant Disaster." It's an hour-by-hour account of the invasion and the events that led up to it. He says even today, the Bay of Pigs remains one of the most important events in American history.
Mr. JIM RASENBERGER (Author, "The Brilliant Disaster"): Well, it really was the beginning of an era that we still live in today of troubled interventions. You know, before the Bay of Pigs, it would have been a fairly skeptical or cynical American who doubted that he lived in a country that was run by competent men engaged in worthwhile enterprises. But the Bay of Pigs changed that.
Not only did it appear immoral to many people, but it also was incompetent. I sort of see it as the beginning of the Vietnam era even before the Vietnam War really took off. The aspect of questioning authority that would go on through the Vietnam era really began with the Bay of Pigs.
ADAMS: A lot of the conventional thinking, when you look back on it, about the Bay of Pigs, puts the CIA up as the aggressors who push Kennedy, the new president, to move forward with the invasion. You say that's not really quite how it happened.
Mr. RASENBERGER: No, it's more complicated than that. It is true that the CIA pushed the operation. The part that I take issue with is that they somehow tricked or fooled the president.
My take on it is that John Kennedy went forward with the Bay of Pigs largely because he could see no way not to go forward with it. He had run against Richard Nixon beating the Eisenhower administration over the head with Castro.
And when he came into office and then was handed this plan, it would have been very difficult for him to say, you know, I don't think I'm going to do this.
He had a lot of doubts about it, a lot of concerns about it, but he never could figure out a way not to do it.
ADAMS: To speak to what went wrong, Fidel Castro had airplanes the CIA didn't know about, air cover wasn't there, there was a second airstrike that people thought was going to happen. And what was the tipping point in this disaster?
Mr. RASENBERGER: In most people's minds, it was the cancellation by John Kennedy of the second airstrike. Now, I have to go back and explain. On April 15th, eight Cuban exile B-26s took off from Nicaragua and flew to Cuba and bombed Cuban airfields trying to destroy Castro's air force. It was always understood that Castro had to have no airplanes for this to work.
Those airstrikes knocked out a number of planes, but they left about half a dozen, maybe seven, planes. There were supposed to be follow-up airstrikes on the morning of April 17th as the invasion was beginning. But John Kennedy at the last moment, on the evening of April 16th, canceled these.
And this essentially left the brigade marooned on this beach that they had just taken. Once those second airstrikes were canceled, and Castro was left with his airplanes, the game was basically over. The brigade was doomed at that point.
ADAMS: You (unintelligible) a very intriguing prospect here that Kennedy may have thought it was going to be a bad idea, wanted to do it anyway, it would give him a great deal of power. He didn't really want to occupy Cuba, which you would have to do if you won, with American troops.
Mr. RASENBERGER: He was caught between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, as I said, he had to go forward. On the other hand, he was very concerned about lighting a match that would spark a great conflagration with the Soviet Union, start a nuclear war.
And he knew that if the American hand showed in this, Khrushchev would then be forced for his own reasons to retaliate, and then he would have to retaliate in kind, and onward it might go.
So as some people said afterwards, he got the best-case scenario. He went forward with it, so he looked like he was strong on communism, and yet it failed, so he didn't have to deal with some terrible consequences that might have followed had it succeeded.
ADAMS: There have been comparisons about what's going on in Libya today to the Bay of Pigs. A headline in The New York Times this past week read: U.S. groups helped nurture Arab opposition. Are there lessons from the Bay of Pigs that you can truly apply to what's going on in the Middle East?
Mr. RASENBERGER: One lesson would be - certainly would apply to Iraq would be: Don't assume when we go into another country that immediately, the locals will all come and gather behind our cause.
We also have to remember, and I think this may apply to Libya, we don't know: The cure may be worse than the disease. And indeed, it was. Castro became far more powerful after the invasion. He became more closely tied to the Soviet Union after the invasion.
Those are two big lessons. You know, in the Kennedy administration, these were people famously known as the best and the brightest. They were all supremely confident, supremely successful people. One of the lessons I take from it is maybe it would be wise for presidents to have a few people in their administrations who weren't supreme successes, just people maybe more acquainted with, you know, the possibilities of things not going well.
ADAMS: Jim Rasenberger, his new book is "The Brilliant Disaster: JFK, Castro and America's Doomed Invasion of Cuba's Bay of Pigs." Thank you, sir.